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Judd v. United States District Court, W.D. Texas

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KEITH RUSSELL JUDD v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
No. 99-5260. Decided October 12, 1999
   PER CURIAM.
   Pro se petitioner Judd seeks leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this re-
quest as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Judd is allowed 
until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the docketing 
fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in 
compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1.  We also direct the 
Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or 
petitions for extraordinary writs from Judd in noncriminal 
matters unless he first pays the docketing fee required by 
Rule 38 and submits his petitions in compliance with Rule 
33.1.
   Judd has abused this Court's certiorari and extraordi-
nary writ processes.  On May 30, 1995, we invoked Rule 
39.8 to deny Judd in forma pauperis status with respect to 
a petition for an extraordinary writ.  See In re Judd, 515 
U. S. 1101.  Prior to this Rule 39.8 denial, Judd had filed 
six petitions for certiorari, all of which were both frivolous 
and had been denied without recorded dissent.  Since the 
Rule 39.8 denial, Judd has filed four petitions for certio-
rari, all of which were also frivolous and denied without 
recorded dissent.  The instant petition for certiorari thus 
brings Judd's total number of frivolous filings to 12.
   We enter the order barring prospective filings for the 
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).  Judd's abuse 
of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has 
been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction 
accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent Judd 
from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which 
might be imposed on him.  The order will, however, allow 
this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of 
petitioners who have not abused our processes.
It is so ordered.
   JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
   For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully 
dissent.