No. 01-896

_____________ __________________________ ____ ___________

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

______________ ________________________ __ ______________

FORD MOTOR COMPANY and

CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA), N.A.

Petitioners,

v.

JOHN B. McCAULEY, et al.,

Respondents.

____________________ ____ ___

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

__________________________________ ___ _ _ _______________

BRIEF FOR TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE AS

AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS

___________________________ ____________ _ ______________

Arthur Bryant                       Roger L. Mandel

Trial Lawyers for                           Counsel of Record

     Public Justice, P.C.                     Marc R. Stanley

One Kaiser Plaza                            Stanley, Mandel & Iola, L.L.P.

Suite 275                        3100 Monticello Ave., Suite 750

Oakland, CA 94612                        Dallas, TX 75205                          

(510) 622-8150                                (214) 443-4300                              

Michael Quirk                                    Mark A. Chavez                                                       

Trial Lawyers for                           Karin Kramer

     Public Justice, P.C.                     Chavez & Gertler, L.L.P.

1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.     42 Miller Avenue

Suite 800                                           Mill Valley, CA 94941

Washington, DC 20036                   (415) 381-5599

(202) 797-8600  

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PRINCIPLES MANDATE STRICT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONSTRUCTION OF THE AMOUNT

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IN CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

II.. . . . . . . . . . .IF A DEFENDANT'S COSTS OF COMPLYING

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . WITH AN INJUNCTION CAN BE USED TO

. . . . . . . . . . . .SATISFY THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

REQUIREMENT IN A CLASS ACTION, THE

COST TO THE DEFENDANT HAS TO EXCEED

$75,000 PER CLASS MEMBER TO DO SO. . . . . . . . .8

A.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Requiring the Defendant's Costs to Exceed

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$75,000 Per Class Member is the Only

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Approach Consistent with Snyder and Zahn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Page

B.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Majority of Lower Courts Have Purported

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .to Reject the Use of the Defendant's Viewpoint

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in Class Action Cases, But Their Decisions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Actually Constitute Examples of the Proper

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Application of the Defendant's Viewpoint

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pursuant to Snyder and Zahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Approach Advocated by Petitioners

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and Amici Would Severely Damage

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant Federal and State Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

III.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SHOULD A DEFENDANT'S CLERICAL

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OR MINISTERIAL COSTS OF

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COMPLIANCE WITH AN INJUNCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .COUNT TOWARDS THE AMOUNT

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IN CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

IV.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .PETITIONERS' ATTEMPT TO BRING

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THIS CASE UNDER THE "COMMON

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .AND UNDIVIDED INTEREST" EXCEPTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TO THE NONAGGREGATON RULE

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SHOULD BE REJECTED BY THE COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n,

414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Anti-

Trust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997). . . . . . 9-13, 15, 21, 22

Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc.,

230 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Eagle v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,

769 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24-25

In Re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,

264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 25, 27

Gilman v. BHC Sec., Inc.,

104 F.3d 1418 (2d Cir. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24, 25

Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co.,

19 F. Supp. 2d 475 (M.D.N.C. 1998). . . . . . . . . . .7-8, 11, 15, 25

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n,

423 U.S. 333 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank,

314 U.S. 63 (1941). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 6

Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

265 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 19, 25, 26

Cases Page(s)

Littleton v. Shelter Ins. Cos.,

2000 WL 356408 (S.D. Ill. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Lonnquist v. J.C. Penney Co.,

421 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Massachusetts State Pharm. Ass'n v. Federal

Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1970). . . . . . . .16

Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 761013

(D. Me. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank,

994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16, 25

Rodgers v. General Elec. Capital Corp.,

1998 WL 128675 (N.D. Ill. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp.,

91 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 13

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,

863 F. Supp. 1156 (C.D. Cal. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14, 18, 26

Snow v. Ford Motor Co.,

561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 19, 25

Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). . . . . . .6-9, 15-18, 23, 25

Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,

77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). . . . . . 7   7

Cases Page(s)

Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). . . .8-12, 15-18, 23

Constitution:

U.S. Const. amend. X.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

U.S. Const. art. III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1332. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

28 U.S.C. § 1367. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ………………………………………………7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 ………………………………………………7

Other Authorities:

D.R. Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas Pursuing

Public Goals for Private Gain, Executive Summary

(Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Nat'l Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive

Acts and Practices § 8.6.1 (5th ed. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Nat'l Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive

Acts and Practices § 8.6.2.1 (5th ed. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Nat'l Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive

Acts and Practices § 8.6.2.2 (5th ed. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

             Trial Lawyers for Public Justice ("TLPJ") is a national public interest law firm that specializes in precedent-setting and socially significant civil litigation. TLPJ is dedicated to using trial lawyers' skills and strategies to advance the public good. Litigating nationally in both federal and state courts, TLPJ prosecutes cases designed to advance consumers' and victims' rights, environmental protection and safety, civil rights and civil liberties, occupational health and employees' rights, the preservation and improvement of the civil justice system, and the protection of the poor and the powerless. TLPJ has filed dozens of amicus briefs in support of those objectives.

             As part of its efforts to ensure the proper working of the civil justice system, TLPJ has long fought to preserve injury victims' rights from unconstitutional encroachment, federal preemption, and class action abuse. In fact, TLPJ is the only national public interest law firm that both prosecutes a broad range of class actions and has a special project dedicated to fighting class action abuse. TLPJ believes that Petitioners' attempt to expand the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction over class actions would violate fundamental constitutional principles, conflict with numerous decisions of this Court, endanger victims' rights, and increase the likelihood of class action abuse. We thus submit this brief to explain why, under our Constitution, laws, and federal system of government, this Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reject Petitioners' attempt to dramatically expand the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction over class actions.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners and their supporters urge this Court to radically alter its diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence in two respects: (1) to assert jurisdiction for the first time over state law class actions in which all the members of the proposed class assert only claims for modest amounts against the defendants, and (2) more fundamentally, to change its 150 year old policy of strictly construing diversity jurisdiction in deference to states' interests and the overwhelming case load of federal courts to an approach of liberally construing diversity jurisdiction in order to save major corporations from the alleged infirmity of state court class action practice. This Court should firmly reject this radical request.

Looking to Congress' multiple amendments to the diversity jurisdiction statute to raise the jurisdictional amount, this Court long ago surmised a Congressional intent to limit federal courts to hearing only truly significant state law cases between diverse parties. The Court also long ago noted diversity jurisdiction's inherent infringement on states' constitutional right to enact statutes for the benefit of their citizens and to adjudicate disputes arising out of those statutes in their own courts.

Based thereon, this Court has always construed diversity jurisdiction narrowly, consistently holding that multiple plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims which would not exceed the jurisdictional amount may not aggregate those claims in order to exceed the jurisdictional amount. In other words, separate and distinct state law claims for amounts too insignificant to qualify for federal court adjudication remain so even when joined together with other such claims such that the total amount at stake for the defendant would exceed the jurisdictional minimum.

Large corporate defendants have long tried to avoid the nonaggregation doctrine by claiming that a disproportionate share of the total damages or relief requested by all of the joint plaintiffs could be recovered by any one of them in an individual suit, such that each and every plaintiff allegedly would satisfy the jurisdictional amount. They tried this initially with attorneys' fees and punitive damages, but the lower courts overwhelmingly rejected their tactic. Now, they try it with injunctive relief.

More specifically, Petitioners ask this Court to hold that the amount in controversy is satisfied if the injunctive relief sought by the named plaintiff in the context of a class action suit would cost more than $75,000 if sought by any one class member in a hypothetical individual suit. Petitioners' approach has serious and fatal flaws.

Initially, it ignores the reality of the class action suit pending before a district court in favor of a hypothetical individual suit in which the plaintiff asks for classwide, rather than individual, injunctive relief. Further, it ignores the fact that the cost of providing classwide injunctive relief is equally attributable to all members of the proposed class, not 100% to just one plaintiff and 0% to the rest.

More fundamentally, Petitioners' approach constitutes a major violation of the nonaggregation rule. It grants diversity jurisdiction over state law class actions which, in reality, constitute nothing more than the joinder or consolidation of multiple very small individual suits. Accordingly, virtually any state law class action seeking injunctive relief on behalf of a significant class would satisfy the jurisdictional amount, threatening to deluge the already overburdened federal courts with a plethora of purely state law class actions. Indeed, Petitioners identify nothing unique about this case that would prevent their arguments from applying to virtually all consumer class actions.

             Beyond the infringement on states' constitutional prerogatives and the inevitable drastic impact on federal court dockets, Petitioners' proposed standard would devastate the enforcement of state consumer protection statutes as many plaintiffs would forego seeking injunctive relief in order to keep their suits in state courts. These impacts at both the federal and state levels strongly counsel against this Court radically altering its diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence at the behest of large companies seeking only to gain an advantageous forum in which to defend against the claims of millions of ordinary consumers.

This Court's precedents dictate an approach far different from that advanced by Petitioners and their amici. To state it simply, if the defendant's cost of complying with a proposed injunction can satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, it can only do so if it exceeds $75,000 per class member.

Furthermore, in cases where the injunctive or equitable relief serves to provide alternative relief to monetary damages, the maximum amount of recoverable damages per class member constitutes the amount in controversy for each class member, rather than the higher cost per class member of compliance with the injunction by the defendant. This is because the parties in such cases will always agree to settle for the maximum recoverable monetary damages in lieu of more expensive injunctive relief.

             Petitioners also seek to have this Court hold that purely clerical or ministerial costs of compliance with an injunction should be included in the calculation of the amount in controversy. Such a holding would, however, fundamentally clash with the nonaggregation rule and bring virtually every state law class action of any size seeking either injunctive relief or monetary damages into the federal courts.

             Finally, Petitioners alternatively seek to fall into an exception to the nonaggregation doctrine for cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest. Because relief could be granted in this case to any plaintiff or class member individually without providing relief to all the other class members, plaintiffs below assert separate and distinct rights, not a single right in a common and undivided interest.

ARGUMENT

I.          THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES MANDATE STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT.

Petitioners and their amici argue for a dramatic expansion of diversity jurisdiction that would shift the vast majority of state law class actions seeking injunctive relief from state to federal courts. In support, a number of the amici devote considerable time to detailing the supposed evils of class action practice in state courts and the supposed virtue of federal class action practice. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Manufacturers in Support of Petitioners at 20-28; Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2-3 & 8-16. They do so for the purpose of persuading this Court that it should liberally construe diversity jurisdiction to maximize the number of class actions adjudicated in federal courts and, correspondingly, minimize the number of class actions resolved in state courts. Their arguments unabashedly call for this Court to set aside over 150 years of its jurisprudence narrowly construing diversity jurisdiction.

             In Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, this Court succinctly summarized that jurisprudence and the reasons for it:

The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity jurisdiction is one of jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensibilities, and of relieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden of 'business that intrinsically belongs in state courts' in order to keep them free for their distinctive federal business. [citations omitted]. 'The policy of the statute (conferring diversity upon the district courts) calls for its strict construction. The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution (Amendment 10), to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary section of the Constitution (Article 3). …Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.' [citation omitted]. In defining the boundaries of diversity jurisdiction, this Court must be mindful of this guiding Congressional policy.

314 U.S. 63, 76-7 (1941).

             The deference to state governments and courts which requires the strict construction of the diversity statute does not represent mere lip service to abstract principles of federalism. Rather, it derives from the very real and concrete right and desire of states to pass laws for the benefit of their citizens and have them interpreted and implemented by their own courts which have the requisite familiarity and expertise to interpret them in accordance with legislative intent. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1204 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) ("The state courts have an independent interest in the construction and the enforcement of Tennessee's anti-trust and consumer protection statutes. Absent a clear basis for federal jurisdiction, a Tennessee state court is the appropriate forum for such decisions.").

             The other basis for the strict construction of the diversity statute--the desire not to further burden already overburdened federal courts with a wave of new state law cases--is equally concrete. As this Court noted in Snyder v. Harris, significant changes to the "amount in controversy" jurisprudence or to the aggregation doctrine could result in a "most noticeable" expansion of the federal case load in class actions brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).

             In fact, that comment by the Court in 1969 would constitute a drastic understatement today. According to a Rand Institute Study, a reasonable estimate is that nearly 60% of reported class action decisions arose in state courts from 1995 to 1996. D.R. Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain, Executive Summary at 6 (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1999). This represents thousands of class actions that would be shifted from state to federal court if Petitioners and their amici have their way.

             As part of its strict construction of the diversity statute, this Court long ago held that when two or more plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct rights of recovery join together in a single suit for convenience and economy they may not add their claims together to meet the jurisdictional minimum, but rather each must assert claims in the requisite jurisdictional amount. Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). Only one year after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court applied this principle to class actions brought under Rule 23. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). These holdings comport with Rule 82's command that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including their various joinder provisions, such as Rule 23, shall not be construed to extend or limit federal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 337.

             Significantly, this long-settled doctrine that separate and distinct claims cannot be aggregated to meet the required jurisdictional amount flows directly from the required strict construction of the diversity statute and the underlying principles that suits involving issues of state law brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship should typically be tried in state courts and that only a compelling reason would justify adding to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system. Id. at 339-401. Contrary to these principles, Petitioners and their supporters ask this Court to adopt a liberal construction of the diversity statute without regard to its history and purpose based instead on their own preference for a federal forum, a parochial interest that has no place in judicial construction of a statute.

             This Court should decline Petitioners' invitation to discard its long-standing conservative diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence. The Court should resolve any doubt about the proper extent of diversity jurisdiction against, not for, its expansion.

II.         IF A DEFENDANT'S COSTS OF COMPLYING WITH AN INJUNCTION CAN BE USED TO SATISFY THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT IN A CLASS ACTION, THE COST TO THE DEFENDANT HAS TO EXCEED $75,000 PER CLASS MEMBER TO DO SO.

TLPJ takes no position on whether the amount in controversy should be measured pursuant to the plaintiff's viewpoint rule, the either viewpoint rule or the more flexible approach described in Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481-2 (M.D.N.C. 1998). Similarly, TLPJ takes no position as to whether an exception to the either viewpoint rule should exist for class actions, although TLPJ believes that most or all of the cases purporting to recognize that exception and then to apply the plaintiff's viewpoint rule actually constitute a correct application of the defendant's view of the amount in controversy.

Rather, if this Court holds that the either viewpoint rule can be used to determine the amount in controversy in a class action in which class members assert separate and distinct claims for injunctive relief, TLPJ urges the Court to make clear exactly when the defendant's costs of compliance with the injunction will satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Specifically, the Court should hold that the cost to the defendant must exceed $75,000 for each and every named plaintiff and absent class member, such that the total cost of compliance divided by the total number of class members exceeds $75,000.

A.         Requiring the Defendant's Costs to Exceed $75,000 Per Class Member is the Only Approach Consistent With Snyder and Zahn.

In Snyder v. Harris, this Court held that, under the long-standing aggregation doctrine, the separate and distinct claims of all the members of a proposed class may not be aggregated together to meet the required jurisdictional amount where none of the named plaintiffs or absent class members individually would have a claim that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount. 394 U.S. at 339-41. Subsequently, in Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., this Court held that each named plaintiff and absent member of a proposed class must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in order for diversity jurisdiction to exist. 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). In that case, the claims of each of the named plaintiffs satisfied the jurisdictional amount (as presumably did the claims of the vast majority of the proposed class), but the district court found that not every individual member of the class had suffered damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount. 414 U.S. at 292.

The necessary consequence of this rule is that a federal court may have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a plaintiff individually but not have jurisdiction over a suit asserting the exact same claims brought by the exact same plaintiff as a named plaintiff on behalf of a proposed class. As the Seventh Circuit explained:

But it is implicit in the rule that forbids aggregation of class members' separate claims that it will sometimes be more difficult for a defendant desiring to remove a diversity case to federal court to establish the minimum amount of controversy in a multiplaintiff case than in a much smaller single-plaintiff case.

In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Anti-Trust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Brand Name").

Indeed, under Snyder and Zahn, a federal district court would not have jurisdiction over a 100-member proposed class action in which the named plaintiff and 98 absent members of the class had separate and distinct caims of $100,000 each and one absent class member had a claim of $74,999. This principle applies equally to class actions in which class members assert separate and distinct claims for injunctive relief, and Petitioners' entire appeal constitutes nothing more than a creative attempt to avoid its consequences.

Specifically, Petitioners and their supporters argue that if a defendant's cost of compliance with an injunction as to any one named plaintiff or absent class member would exceed $75,000, considered as if that one plaintiff had brought an individual suit seeking the exact same injunctive relief sought in the class suit, then the jurisdictional amount is met. Brief for Petitioners at 18; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25. They took this proposed standard from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Brand Name:

Whatever the form of relief sought, each plaintiff's claim must be held separate from each other plaintiff's claim from both the plaintiff's and the defendant's standpoint. The defendant in such a case is deemed to face multiple claims for injunctive relief, each of which must be separately evaluated. [citation omitted]. … The test, we repeat, is the cost to each defendant of an injunction running in favor of one plaintiff; otherwise the nonaggregation rule would be violated.

123 F.3d at 610.

             What Petitioners and their supporters studiously avoid acknowledging, however, is that the Seventh Circuit articulated this standard in light of its prior holding that the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, had overruled Zahn, such that if at least one named plaintiff satisfies the jurisdictional minimum, "…the other named plaintiffs and the unnamed class members can, by virtue of the supplemental jurisdiction conferred on the federal district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, piggyback on that plaintiff's claim …[e]ven though their own claims are for less than the jurisdictional minimum amount." Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 607 (citing, Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-33 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In this light, the Seventh Circuit's articulation of the rule makes at least some sense. If only one named plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional minimum, a court could look to see if the cost of providing injunctive relief to just that one plaintiff would exceed $75,000 if it were sought by that named plaintiff in an individual suit. The court would have supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining named plaintiffs and absent class members without regard to whether the cost of injunctive relief would exceed $75,000 for each and every one of them in the class context.

             In this case, Petitioners have stipulated that they do not seek to have this Court revisit Zahn, but rather that they merely ask this Court to apply Zahn to class claims for injunctive relief. Reply Brief for Petitioners in Support of Certiorari at 5. Accordingly, the standard for ascertaining the amount in controversy from the defendant's viewpoint articulated in Brand Name cannot govern in this case in which the continued vitality of Zahn has not been challenged.

             As set forth above, under Zahn, the amount in controversy must be satisfied as to each and every named plaintiff and absent class member. Crucially, this must be done in the context of the actual class action suit before the district court and the classwide injunctive relief sought in that suit, not based upon a hypothetical and highly unlikely suit in which an individual class member seeks classwide injunctive relief, as Petitioners and their supporters urge.

             The facts of this case convincingly demonstrate this proposition. The named plaintiffs sought specific performance of their contracts providing for the rebate program. Should Petitioners choose to accomplish that by reinstating the original rebate program, no competent economist or accountant would attribute the entire fixed cost of reinstating the program to one class member alone and attribute no portion of the fixed cost of reinstatement to all the other class members. Rather, he or she would divide the total fixed cost of reinstatement by the total number of class members and attribute to each class member the class member's proportionate share of the fixed cost.

             That proportionate share attributable to each class member constitutes the amount in controversy for each class member which must be considered pursuant to Zahn. Simply put, the proper method for calculating the amount in controversy for each named plaintiff and absent class member asserting separate and distinct claims for injunctive relief is to take the total cost to the defendant of compliance with the injunction and divide it by the number of members in the proposed class. Only if that results in a quotient that exceeds $75,000 has the plaintiff or removing defendant met the Zahn requirement that the cost of compliance with the injunction must exceed $75,000 as to each and every named plaintiff and absent class member.

             Even under the Seventh Circuit's approach in Brand Name of determining only the amount in controversy as to one named plaintiff, the amount in controversy should be measured in the context of the actual class action case pending before the court, not in a hypothetical individual suit in which the named plaintiff inexplicably seeks classwide injunctive relief. In the context of that class action, a competent economist or accountant would, likewise, attribute to the named plaintiff an amount in controversy equal only to that named plaintiff's proportionate share of the defendant's cost of providing the classwide injunctive relief.

             A number of district courts have properly applied the defendant's viewpoint of the amount in controversy in this manner. For example, in Littleton v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 2000 WL 356408 at 2 (S.D. Ill. 2000), the district court took the defendant's claimed cost of complying with the requested injunctive relief of $802,755, divided it by the approximately 541,947 class members and concluded that the cost to the defendant of injunctive relief in favor of the named plaintiff (and, consequently, to each of the absent class members) amounted to about $1.50, far less than the jurisdictional requirement.

             Similarly, in Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., the district court noted that Microsoft's estimate of the money required to provide the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs, $58.5 million, when divided by anything more than 710 class members, would "…bring the apportionment of that total cost among each class member to less than $75,000 per class member." 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. Thus, that district court held that the jurisdictional amount had not been met. Id.

As another district court put it, "Even the Seventh Circuit, which seems to have adopted the 'either viewpoint' (i.e., plaintiff or defendant)…seems also to suggest that if the defendant's cost is considered, it must then essentially be divided by the number of potential plaintiffs." Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 761013 at 1 fn. 1 (D. Me. 2000) (citing Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 609-10). Only Petitioners and their supporters, by virtue of assessing the defendant's cost of compliance with an injunction in the context of a fictional individual suit in which the named plaintiff seeks classwide injunctive relief, would attribute the entire fixed cost of providing classwide injunctive relief to just the named plaintiff.

             The fictional and improper nature of Petitioners' suggested approach of valuing the cost to a defendant of providing the relief requested in the actual class suit as if it had been brought in an individual suit by the named plaintiff is easily demonstrated. In this case, for example, it is highly unlikely that in an individual suit against Petitioners a plaintiff would have requested reinstatement of the prior program set up to accrue credits for millions of people or that any court would have considered this a realistic request for relief.

Rather, any plaintiff in an individual suit would have requested a court to order Petitioners to honor the terms of his contract by keeping track of his purchases, which would have required nothing more than one employee reviewing his bills each month and keeping a running tally. Even if the plaintiff had asked for reinstatement of the entire program, it is highly unlikely that any court would have considered such a request for relief to be potentially recoverable and thus a realistic basis for calculating the amount in controversy.